Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review of insolvency law: the creditors cannot have any greater right than the debtor. Are these maxims helpful? The fi rst principle is core to the transfer of property. Yet it is formulated negatively. That the transferee cannot have a better right than his author is interesting; but it is surely as important to know what rights the transferee acquires as what rights he does not. 4 The assignatus principle applies to the tripartite situation involved in the transfer of a claim. But the maxim has been applied to transfers of land, 5 and, shorn of the "assignatus" prefi x -as it was originally in Scots law 6 -the maxim may be applied generally to all transfers: the transferee takes jure auctoris, he exercises the rights of his author. 7 This is but a positive formulation of nemo plus. 8 Similarly, although tantum et tale tends to be used only where creditors are involved 9 (such as to describe the rights of an arrester 10 or other judicial assignee, 11 or the position of a trustee in sequestration), it has also been employed to describe the effect of a voluntary assignation.
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The same principles that regulate the transfer of real rights regulate the transfer of personal rights. The only difference is in formulation. What is more contentious, however, is whether the principles which regulate voluntary transfers also apply to transfers which occur by force of law. There are no reasons in principle why there should be differences. But if some authorities were taken at face value, a more complicated and perhaps unintelligible picture would emerge. With Lord Rodger's speech in Burnett's Tr v Grainger 13 comes an opportunity to clarify many of the problems that surround the rules of competition. Some of the confusion is attributable to the Scots lawyer's focus on Latin maxims rather than underlying legal principle; 14 but much stems simply from inherent complexity. The topics involved are notoriously diffi cult: fraud, trusts, diligence and insolvency. When Lord Meadowbank encountered this subject, he cautioned, "I am afraid to speak of this case with too much confi dence. It goes deep into principle." 15 He was not wrong.
B. FRAUD AND TRANSFER
Scots law has a wide and general principle of fraud. As McBryde points out, fraud is an example of where damages in delict are available for pure economic loss. 16 Erskine describes fraud as "any machination or contrivance to deceive". 17 With such breadth and fl exibility, however, comes imprecision. In the case of a double sale, for example, the transferee's knowledge of prior rights has been labelled "bad faith". And bad faith has been equated with fraud. But is the transferee's fraud really the same as the fraud of the person transferring to him, which was criminalised by the Stellionate Act of 1540? 18 Stellionate was perpetrated by the seller, not the buyer. 19 Similarly the rules regarding the preservation of a bankrupt's assets for the benefi t of his creditors are linked to fraud. And it is because [the trustee in sequestration] is treated as an adjudging creditor, and not merely as a purchaser, of the debtor's heritable estate that the trustee can set out to destroy the rights of uninfeft purchasers of that estate by infefting himself before they do. A purchaser could not do this: Rodger (Builders) v Fawdry 1950 SC 583.
C. BURNETT'S TR v GRAINGER
"The requirement of good faith", he adds later, "applies only to purchasers".
46

D. TRUSTEES IN SEQUESTRATION
The act and warrant awarded to a trustee in sequestration is but a collective diligence for the benefi t of the bankrupt's creditors. In Burnett's Tr, Lord Rodger went to considerable trouble to trace the development of the tantum et tale principle and its effect on diligence creditors. As he pointed out, there has been considerable oscillation of views in respect of the trustee in sequestration's position. Bona fi de purchasers cannot be prejudiced by their author's fraud. If, therefore, a trustee in sequestration were viewed as a bona fi de purchaser, the position would be clear: the assets transferred to the trustee would not be affected by the fraud of the bankrupt. 48 But some pre-Burnett sources did not recognise creditors to be in such a position. There are numerous dicta to the effect that, because he takes tantum et tale, a trustee in sequestration "cannot have a greater right than the bankrupt". 49 At one time tantum et tale was referred to as a "general principle".
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Later the principle was said not to be different from maxims invoked to describe other transfers. 51 This was followed by the somewhat arbitrary assertion that the doctrine applies only to moveables. Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review bankrupt's fraud. These cases require the defrauded creditor to be returned to his pre-fraud position without having to rank as an ordinary unsecured creditor. But fraud is a personal obligation. And a bankrupt debtor, by defi nition, cannot fulfi l his personal obligations. Preferring the fraud creditor over other personal creditors is, therefore, quite arbitrary. What is given to one must be taken from many.
In some tantum et tale cases, it is unclear how the trustee in sequestration was viewed. If the "take advantage" cases are correct, the trustee cannot be a bona fi de onerous transferee. We can therefore sympathise with Lord Westbury who, when confronted with a Scotch appeal on the issue, characterised the trustee as a gratuitous alienee. 56 at 462 confi dently ventured that "Certainly no Scottish lawyer can be got to subscribe to Lord Westbury's dictum that a trustee in bankruptcy is only a 'gratuitous alienee'." Disapproval of Lord Westbury's speech extends beyond his reference to "gratuitous alienee". His suggestion that "an obligation to do an act with respect to property creates a trust" was described by Lorimer as "a hare whose course was devious and not to be followed": see J C Lorimer, " Tantum The position of the trustee in sequestration does not seem to me to differ from that of any other assignee as regards a claim of this kind. The claim is in the nature of a nomen debiti -an incorporeal moveable right which passes by assignation -and therefore the trustee is in no better position than an onerous assignee … but I should only like to say that I am not inclined to go so far as Lord Westbury does [in Fleming v Howden] in describing the position of a trustee in a sequestration as being the same as that of a "gratuitous alienee". I should rather put it in this way -that a trustee in sequestration is in no better position than an onerous assignee who has bought a debt.
Unfortunately there is no positive assertion that a trustee in sequestration is an onerous bona fi de transferee, only that he is no better than an onerous transferee. At best, this wording is an indication that a trustee in sequestration is not to be considered as different from an onerous bona fi de alienee. At worst, the dictum suggests that a trustee in sequestration is somewhere between a gratuitous transferee and a bona fi de one. 63 That is an unsatisfactory answer. It tells us nothing about the principles that should be applied on competition.
In the event, Lord Inglis came to the somewhat incongruous conclusion that, although the trustee was not a gratuitous alienee, he was subject to the debtor's personal obligations: "If the bankrupt had used the arrestments he would have committed a breach of trust, and I do not think the The right to raise action and do diligence for the recovery of debt is a legal incident of the right to the debt. It arises as a common law right in favour of all creditors against their debtors, and the pursuer [the trustee in sequestration] in using the arrestment in question is availing himself of that right only. Having an unqualifi ed right to the debt, why shall he be prevented from doing so? Because it is said that the bankrupt could not have effectually used an arrestment. The answer to that argument -an answer I humbly think sound -is this, that the objection to an arrestment by the bankrupt is personal -a personal bar which applies to him individually because of the duty or personal obligation which lay upon him …; but although he failed in his duty -and his failure might give rise to a claim of damages … -yet (1) this obligation in no way affects or binds the trustee for his creditors, who is not bound to fulfi l personal obligations of the bankrupt -least of all obligations arising out of the bankrupt holding the offi ce of a trustee; and (2) that the duty and obligation which affected and affect the bankrupt were not in any sense inherent qualifi cations of the right which the trustee in sequestration acquired under the Bankrupt Statute. So there is nothing to deprive him of the ordinary remedy of a creditor for recovery of his debt. 
E. ASSIGNEES: AN EXCEPTION?
In Burnett's Tr, Lord Rodger states that while creditors need not, purchasers must, be in good faith. 68 But that helpful principle does not directly address the purchaser's position. What, precisely, are his rights? Assuming a purchaser is in good faith, can he take the object transferred free of the transferor's personal obligations? In particular, is a good faith assignee subject to his author's fraud? The paradigm assignation involves three parties: cedent, assignee and debtor. It is still a transfer and as such should be subject to the general principles which affect all transfers. Admittedly, matters are complicated slightly because the object fraud on transfer and on insolvency Vol 11 2007 of the transfer is a personal right, so that defences arising out of the relationship which gave birth to the claim being assigned may be raised by the debtor against any subsequent assignee. But vices (such as fraud) perpetrated by an assignee against a cedent are different. They give rise to personal obligations, but personal obligations that are unrelated to the personal rights which are the object of transfer. Fraudulent conduct which induces a transfer may render the transfer voidable. Or again, a transfer in breach of an obligation not to transfer may be voidable. Such voidability may be pled against the immediate transferee (subject to the requirements of the offside goals rule) but not against subsequent transferees.
Nevertheless it has long been suggested that assignation of claims is exceptional: the claim of a defrauded fourth party (e.g. an earlier cedent in the transfer chain), it is argued, can be pled against even bona fi de onerous singular successors. Stair writes: 69 But in personal rights the fraud of authors is relevant against singular successors though not partaking or conscious of the fraud when they purchased; because assignees are but mere procurators, albeit in rem suam: and therefore they are in the same case with their cedents, except that their cedents' oaths after they were denuded, cannot prejudge their assignees.
If, however, assignees are mere procurators, why does Stair describe the cedent as being "denuded"? The contradiction lays bare the incoherence of the procuratio analysis of assignation. Either claims can be transferred or they cannot. And in Scots law they can be; the language of procuratio being clothing and cosmetics. Stripped of that superfi cial exterior there is a concept of substance: the idea of transfer.
Yet the procuratio analysis, outdated and artifi cial as it is, endures. Indeed the most recent exponent of the view that an assignation is nothing more than a procuratio in rem suam is Lord Rodger himself. 70 Such an approach is, with respect, unhelpful. Scots law never needed the procuratio analysis to explain assignation. Like French customary law, assignation or cession -i.e. outright transfer -had long been sanctioned. In making references to procuratio, Stair sought to bring the Scottish history into line with the Civilian history of cession. That treatment, however, was inconsistent with the existing body of Scots law. Bell, for example, strongly criticises Stair's view.
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Once it is accepted that assignation is a transfer (as it always has been in Scots law), then the position with regard to fraud should, in principle, be no different than with other assets. A transfer induced by fraud or made fraudulently may be A2 then assigned to A3. A3 was in good faith and gave value. A1 then sought to reduce the assignation he had granted to A2 on the basis of fraud. A3 claimed his position was unassailable. The pursuers pointed to the distinction between fraud giving rise to the assignation (dolus dans) and incidental fraud (dolus incidens).
Fraud of the former type rendered the transfer null and void. The assignee, A3, it was argued, was thus unprotected. 74 The fraud argument was typical for the times.
It was a broad-axe approach. No distinction was made between void and voidable conveyances. Although multifarious conduct of a generally wrongful nature could amount to "fraud", once that imperceptible line was crossed and the conduct labelled "fraudulent", that, so to speak, was that. The fraud had to be undone and the whole transaction would be brought tumbling down. Such reasoning, however, is unsophisticated. It ignores a crucial fact: since the time when the assignation induced by fraud had been granted to A2, A2 had assigned to an onerous transferee, A3. No one would countenance A3 being prejudiced if the transfer were of land or goods. The rationale would be that the effect on commerce would be catastrophic. Yet claims are more moveable and tradable than goods, to say nothing of land. Claims have considerable economic value. As a starting point, then, we would expect at least the same protection to be accorded . Burden apparently involved a reduction of a disposition elicited from one Kennedy while he was drunk, "in so far as the property was not vested in a third party by infeftment". Since the third party transferee was not infeft, there was no problem with reduction. There was no bona fi de onerous transferee. Although it was customary to refer to the holder of an unrecorded disposition as an "uninfeft proprietor", such a description was a misnomer: an unregistered holder was not owner and could not become owner without registration. to onerous assignees of claims as to transferees of other assets. That assignees should receive less protection from extrinsic fraud is inexplicable.
The court in McDonnells may have been alive to these concerns. On Stair's view of assignation as a mere procuratio, however, the answer was clear: if each assignee was but a procurator -a representative -of the cedent, then it was readily understandable that any assignee, no matter how remote, would be subject to attack if any prior assignee had procured his transfer by fraud. So, in MacDonnells, the court granted reduction. Lord Kames, though not dissenting, was perplexed by the effect of the decision: 75 The difference between the case of nomina debitorum and the other cases is this, and it is mentioned by Lord Stair, -An assignee is nothing else than a procurator in rem suam. Hence, in England, at this day, an assignee must pursue in the name of his cedent. With us an assignee is now held to have the total right. In that respect the law has changed. Why should not the effects of assignations also be changed? For want of this change, our law is, in one particular, a sort of hotch-potch; but we cannot help that.
Lord Kames' protest that he "could not help" the decision is uncharacteristically deferential. 76 It was a point he had investigated. 77 He appreciated that, but for Stair, there was little basis for the procuratio theory of assignation in Scots law. On the contrary, there was a considerable strand of opinion that bona fi de onerous assignees took free from the claims of fourth parties. Although the authorities were not altogether consistent, the issues had been well and long appreciated. It was the analysis of assignation as a procuratio that was problematic. That analysis became orthodox only in 1681 when it was embossed with Stair's seal of approval in the Institutions. There is, however, at least one detailed statement before 1681of the irrelevance of fourth party pleas to a bona fi de assignee. It is not widely known and may thus justify a lengthy quotation: 78 But if he be an assignee for a cause onerous and not participes fraudis, knowing nothing of the back-bond, it is not easy to comprehend how the back-bond or trust can be Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review obtruded or declared against him, so as to clog his right; for what was there in law to put him in male fi de to bargain and contract with that person whom he found to have the sole and undoubted right of the lands or bond standing in his person? How could he without divination know it was only a trust, and that there was a back-bond; there having been no intimation of it [i.e. the trust] to him, no inhibition served upon it to put the lieges in male fi de, or to ascertain that there is such a thing? And if such latent deeds were regarded, there could be no commerce nor freedom in bargaining anent rights. Yea, though the back-bond was registrate, yet that cannot be esteemed a suffi cient intimation, since that registration is not necessitatis, but only "actus merae voluntatis"; and the lieges are not bound to search for it because there is no law enjoining the registration of such back-bonds as necessary, and so no law obliges one to take notice of him. Where a man gets an assignation to a bond and puts his assignation in the register, that will not be such an intimation as will hinder another party from taking a second assignation to that same bond and from being preferred if he intimate fi rst, notwithstanding the registration; for registration is not by our law a suffi cient way of intimation, unless where a special statute has declared and determined it shall be so, as in the case of registration of seasines [sic] by the Act of Parliament of 1617.
This analysis was advanced for its time. There is also little doubt that it was an analysis that was not universally accepted -as McDonnells v Carmichael shows. But it was the view that, correct in principle, was subsequently to prevail in the House of Lords in Redfearn v Sommervails. 79 It is no coincidence that George Joseph Bell fi rst compared the relative claims of a bona fi de onerous assignee and a fourth party asserting a latent right only in the third edition of his Commentaries, published in 1816, shortly after the decision in Redfearn:
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Recollecting the principles upon which assignations were originally admitted, it will not appear wonderful that persons acquiring, by assignation, the rights to debts, and other jura incorporalia, should be considered as coming precisely into the place of the cedent, and as liable, of course, to all the personal exceptions pleadable against him. In that way arose the maxim, "assignatus utitur jure auctoris" which has so often been misunderstood, and held to imply a responsibility like that of an heir.
[ 81 ] But this doctrine, in so far as it has been considered as applicable to any other exceptions than those competent to the debtor in defence against the claim, should not be held good in the present day, when the whole aspect of the law relative to assignations, is altered; and when, instead of being a mere procurator of the original creditor, the assignee is considered as a proper purchaser, holding a cessio in jure, as against the defender, the full jus obligationis, transferred by intimation as property is by delivery.
There is, then, no reason why a predecessor's "fraud" should prejudice an onerous singular successor. There is also no reason to assume that Lord Rodger's speech in Burnett was limited to the transfer of heritable property. Indeed the Vol 11 2007 the edinburgh law review contract comes into existence, Brian Buyer is no longer just a purchaser. He also becomes a creditor. Indeed, a creditor, by defi nition, is the holder of a personal right. 88 All purchasers are creditors. 89 And a purchaser is a creditor who can use diligence: indeed, the use of diligence -by adjudication in implement 90 -was once a common method of implementing the missives. Where does this leave Lord Rodger's principle? On the one hand the purchaser, qua purchaser, must be in good faith; on the other, the purchaser, qua creditor, need not be. Put another way, Lord Rodger's principle -that purchasers must be in good faith, creditors need not be -discriminates against those creditors who happen to be purchasers. The distinction, long discernible in the sources, is illogical and unhelpful. Separating the position of purchasers from creditors does not assist in analysis of the role of good faith in transfer. The reason is simple: good faith is for the law of contract not the law of transfer. The so-called "offside goals rule" has been extended beyond sensible boundaries. Good faith is only relevant at the moment of contract. Privileges may be accorded to the good faith purchaser. Purchase -sale -is a contract. As Stair pointed out, knowledge (of any sort) acquired after conclusion of the contract is not relevant; 91 while anterior knowledge must be certain: private knowledge is also probably irrelevant.
92 Provided the buyer is in good faith when he enters into the contract, . In some cases, bona fi des had been held to cease from the date of citation in an action in which the defender's grounds of belief are contradicted or challenged, but in general bona fi des will not be held to cease till after the fi rst judgement setting it aside has been pronounced, provided this judgment stands without being altered through the various stages of the litigation. In cases where the point is attended with diffi culty, bona fi des will not be held to cease till the ultimate judgment setting it aside has been pronounced (Cleghorn purchaser is a creditor. And, as Lord Rodger rightly concluded, creditors need not be in good faith.
G. GRATUITOUS TRANSFEREES
Perhaps Lord Rodger meant that all creditors except purchasers are relieved of the requirement of good faith. "Purchase" and "credit" imply onerosity. Suppose, then, there is good faith but no consideration? Normally a transfer for no consideration may be subsequently impugned irrespective of the bona fi des of the transferee in the event that the transferor becomes insolvent. sits, at best, uneasily with the general principles of Scots property law. It may be that the decision is no longer consistent even with the English law on which it was based, for English law has since embraced the mandatory publicity of land rights.
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Heritable Reversionary, on the other hand, disregards the publicity principle. The 94 In Laurie v Laurie (1854) 16 D 860, the pursuer failed to record before the seller's bankruptcy. The pursuer sought to enforce this jus ad rem by adjudication in implement, an action the Second Division peremptorily refused. Lord Justice-Clerk Hope remarked (at 863) that he "was sorry to see the point disturbed at all…the deed founded on… is nothing more than a good personal obligation. The pursuer acknowledges this by adopting the form of adjudication in implement and unless we reverse the whole law, we cannot hold that the right can compete with the statutory right of the trustee". 95 (1892) 19 R (HL) 43.The facts were these. A property investment company acquired land. The manager of the company took title in his own name but subsequently executed a declaration of trust in favour of the company. The trust was not, however, recorded in the Register of Sasines. The manager then became bankrupt. His trustee in sequestration took the view that the property fell into the sequestration; the company argued the property was held in trust and should not be divided among the general creditors. The property was sold and the proceeds consigned. The Court of Session held that a latent trust of land could not prejudice creditors and so the proceeds should be distributed pari passu. The House of Lords reversed: the trustee held under a "bare trust" and the company was the "benefi cial owner" of the land. The entire proceeds were therefore given to the company. 98 In elevating the exception to a rule, however, they drew the wrong conclusion. The only way to deal with the Heritable Reversionary doctrine is to extirpate it. But, if that is correct, how are trusts to be accommodated? Two points can be made about the effect of Burnett's Tr on trusts. The fi rst is one of general principle. In Heritable Reversionary it was said that personal creditors of the trustee cannot attach trust property because they take tantum et tale. 99 This is insuffi cient. If creditors do not need to be in good faith post-Burnett, then diligence creditors would not be affected by a trustee's latent personal obligation to a benefi ciary. But this does not mean that personal creditors can now attach trust property. The explanation lies in the doctrinal basis of the law of trusts. Trust assets are not attachable by the trustee's personal creditors because trust assets are held in a different patrimony. The trustee's private creditors may only attach assets which are held in the trustee's private patrimony. 100 That is the general principle. To this extent, therefore, Burnett's Tr is welcome. For it fortifi es the patrimony theory as a doctrinal basis of the trust in Scots law, a theory long discernible in the Scottish sources which has been well articulated by George Gretton 101 and taken up by the Scottish Law Commission. 102 That said, however, the principles of trust law must yield to legal policy. Owners of land who hold as trustees should publicise the nature of their holding on the register. If they do so, trust law can prevail; if not -and despite the decision in Heritable Reversionary -trust law cannot. Third parties cannot be prejudiced by a benefi ciary's latent right. So, where trusts of land are kept secret, it should be possible for the trustee's personal creditors to do diligence against the land; and, if the trustee becomes insolvent, the land should fraud on transfer and on insolvency Vol 11 2007 fall into the trustee's sequestration.
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The second point is a specifi c one. Suppose a trustee conveys in breach of trust. The grantee is protected unless he is in bad faith or took gratuitously. 104 If the transferee gave value, the benefi ciaries are protected: the consideration, by real subrogation, will be held in the trust patrimony. Subject to one exception, the obligation of a bad faith transferee to retransfer property in his possession is indefi nite. It will never prescribe.
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I. RELIANCE ON THE REGISTER
Why are bona fi de purchasers given such favourable treatment? In Burnett's Tr, Lord Rodger opened his analysis with an account of the historical development of the law: 106 At an early stage it was accepted that bona fi de purchasers were not affected by personal rights of the seller which were not recorded in the register. After all, such purchasers could be taken to have consulted the register and to have proceeded on the information about the seller's title to be found there. The same could be said of creditors who insisted on the debtor providing them with a heritable security. Both groups transacted on the faith of the register. But, it was argued, creditors who used adjudication to obtain a security over their debtor's property were different. They had originally chosen to lend money or to transact with the debtor either without taking any security at all or else on the basis of a personal security, such as caution from a third party. At all events, these creditors had not relied on the debtor's land for security and had not therefore relied on his title to the land as set out in the register. So, if it turned out that the debtor had entered into personal obligations relating to the land, such creditors could not claim to have been misled by the unqualifi ed nature of his title in the deeds recorded in the register. If they proceeded to adjudge their debtor's property, there was therefore no reason why they should be in any better position than the debtor himself on whom they had chosen to rely: they should take his property tantum et tale, subject to any personal
